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So long as there shall exist, by reason of law and 
custom, a social condemnation, which, in the face 
of civilization, artificially creates hells on earth, 
and complicates a destiny that is divine, with 
human fatality; so long as the three problems of 
the age — the degradation of man by poverty, the 
ruin of women by starvation, and the dwarfing of 
childhood by physical and spiritual night — are 
not solved; so long as, in certain regions, social 
asphyxia shall be possible; in other words, and 
from a yet more extended point of view, so long 
as ignorance and misery remain on earth, books 
like this cannot be useless. 





This paper aims to present how the United Nations agencies, funds, and programs manage 
Venezuelans' migration crisis in Brazil and which is their degree of interaction in this arrangement. 
In crisis management and humanitarian assistance – where resources are limited and should spend 
effectively – adequately managing interinstitutional interaction is keen to deliver the most needed 
aid and guarantee accountability to affected populations. Building up on Crisis Management (CM) 
literature and standing on the newborn concept of Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM), this 
paper presents how is organized the international humanitarian response system. In sequence, it 
explores which international organizations would be responsible for responding to crisis, their 
mandate, and how they are present in Brazil. Also, the case study presents their degree of 
institutional interaction: collaboration, the most complex among all possible. Finally, it presents 
how this case study connects with the complex dynamic of international development – and 
underdevelopment – to which further studies may contribute to addressing the vulnerability of 
systems, prevent institutional failure, and promote national resilience of society, also acting to 
eradicate poverty. Key characteristics of this research are: fundamental, observational, qualitative, 
both exploratory and explanatory, focused on documental research and retrospective analysis. 
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This chapter offers a retrospect of the Venezuelan crisis, its progression over the past 
decades, aiming to disclose the roots of the high influx of migrants in Brazil. Thenceforth the 
problem statement of this paper will be presented, followed by research general and specific 




TV news, newspaper headlines, political speeches and Internet tweets, used to 
deliver foci and outlets for public anxieties and fears, are currently overflowing 
with references to the 'migration crisis' […]. The impact of the news broadcast 
from that battlefield now comes close to causing a veritable 'moral panic'. […] 
Signs are piling up that public opinion, in cahoots with the ratings covetous media, 
is gradually yet relentlessly approaching the point of 'refugee tragedy fatigue'. 
(BAUMAN, 2016) 
  
Many influential newspapers, such as The New York Times (2019) and Al Jazeera (2019), 
dedicated articles to explain how Venezuela trampled and became the focus of international 
attention for its political instability, economic failure critical social conditions. 
The economic situation in Venezuela deteriorated over the past few years. In 2019, the real 
GDP decreased by 35%. The last available data points out that 35,5% of the Venezuelan labor force 
had no employment in 2018. The country observed high variations in the average consumer price 
index - CPI: from 1980 to 2014, inflation rates varied between 6.2% and 99.9%. Nevertheless, in 
the past 5 years inflation rates exceeded historical records: 121.7% in 2015, 254.9% in 2016, 
438.1% in 2017, 65,374.1% in 2018 and 19,906% in 2019 (IMF, 2020). 
The economy of Venezuela was, for decades, prosperous for its oil reserves. High prices in 
the international market and high-profit rates sustained substantial investments in social programs, 
generating wealth. However, under the government of Hugo Chavez (1998 to 2013), corruption 
and misuse of resources growth slowed down. In addition, oil prices in the international market 
began to fall, leaving the country's economy and domestic investments in a complicated situation 
(AL JAZEERA, 2019; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2019). Followed by the death of Hugo Chavez 
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in 2013, the already delicate economic situation of the country worsened under the leadership of 
Nicolás Maduro. In 2019, after the alleged fraudulent reelection of Nicolás Maduro for a second 
term, the figure of Juan Guaidó - President of the Venezuelan National Assembly - arose as he 
declared himself president. Guaidó received international support from many countries, defending 
new general elections. Supporters from both sides took the streets in the following weeks (THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, 2019). 
In this tense scenario, Venezuelan forces systematically oppressed demonstrations, 
followed by a series of Human Rights violations. Amnesty International (2019) and Human Rights 
Watch - HRW (2020) reported systematic persecution of political opponents, representing an 
offense to the right to freedom of expression, assembly, and association. According to these 
organizations, this represents a threat to political leaders of the opposition and human rights 
defenders who have been targets of the government and security forces. 
Both the Human Rights Watch (2020) and Amnesty International (2020) give special 
attention to extrajudicial executions, torture, and ill-treatment against those opposing Nicolás 
Maduro. Although there is no centralized and reliable source of information, the HRW (2020) 
estimates 18,000 extrajudicially executed people by Venezuelan security forces between 2016 and 
2019. In addition, reports also mention impunity. Tribunals have no judicial independence from 
the executive power, culminating in arbitrary detention in prisons with critical conditions. 
Taking the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - ICC (1998) into account, 
those systematic actions of the government would be characterized as crimes against humanity 
(AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2019). 
 
[...] "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(a) Murder; [...] 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) Torture; [...] 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender [...], or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law [...]; 
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(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; [...] 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
(ICC, 1998, p.3) 
 
The UN Security Council1 brought its attention to Venezuela for the first time in January 
2019. On occasion, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs 
briefed the Council on the deterioration of the economic and political situation in the country, 
endorsing the UN Secretary General's request for non-escalation of the crisis. In April 2019, 
happened the 4th and last meeting of the UNSC on the situation in Venezuela. At the time, the 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator stated that 7 million people needed 
humanitarian assistance, which represented 25% of the country's population at the time, according 
to estimates from UN sources (UNITED NATIONS, 20192). 
International organizations have been fundamental to the humanitarian response and relief 
in Venezuela. In 2019, the International Committee of the Red Cross was responsible for delivering 
320 tons of medical supplies and the treatment of 195,596 people in the country. In addition, the 
institution made substantial improvements to the health care system and to local infrastructure that 
directly affects the population's health, such as WASH (ICRC, 2019). 
As a result, Latin America and the Caribbean - LAC observed an increasing number of 
refugees, migrants, and asylum-seekers from Venezuela in the past years. The R4V Platform 
declared a total number of 5,577,077 refugees and migrants from Venezuela as of March 20213. 
When it comes to pending asylum claims, there were 798,276 on the same date. Information 
gathered on the Regional RMRP4 for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela shows that the flow 
of Venezuelans across Latin America is uneven between countries (R4V, 2019). 
 
 
1 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the most powerful institution of the UN and among 
international organizations (ORAKHELASHVILI, 2005). Its main responsibility is to maintain 
“international peace and security”, being entitled to the use of multiple means to act, including force and 
military action of UN Members. The UN Security Council was established by the United Nations Charter, 
which was signed on 16 June 1945, effective on 24 October 1945 (UNITED NATIONS, 1945). 
2 According to the United Nations Security Council 8452nd meeting transcript. 
3 Dashboard with real time updates available at: https://r4v.info/en/situations/platform. 
4 The Regional Refugees and Migrants Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants for Venezuela is a 




Total refugees and migrants by country as of March 20215 
North and Central America South America Caribbean 
Belize Not informed Argentina 179,203 Aruba Not informed 
Canada 20,775 Bolivia 9,956 Cuba Not informed 
Costa Rica 29,820 Brazil 261,441 Curacao 17,000 
El Salvador Not informed Chile 457,324 Dominican Republic 114,500 
Guatemala Not informed Colombia 1,742,927 Haiti Not informed 
Honduras Not informed Ecuador 443,705 Guadeloupe Not informed 
Mexico 101,648 French Guiana Not informed Puerto Rico Not informed 
Nicaragua Not informed Guyana 23,310 Saint-Barthélemy Not informed 
Panama 121,601 Paraguay 4,934 Saint-Martin Not informed 
United States 394,000 Peru 1,043,460 Trinidad and Tobago 24,169 
  Suriname Not informed   
  Uruguay 14,926   
Source: R4V, 2021; elaborated by the author. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Humanitarian crises are often not analyzed in-depth, compromising future studies. 
In this complex context, the research question that motivates this paper arises: how UN 







5 Numbers reported by host governments by March 2021, reflecting the most recent data reported by each 
government based on its own methodology of data gathering and processing (R4V, 2021). 
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1.3 General Objective 
 
Therefore, this paper aims to understand how United Nations agencies, funds, and programs 
in Brazil manage Venezuelans' migration crisis and the degree of institutional interaction in this 
arrangement. 
 
1.4 Specific Objectives 
 
● Identify which United Nations agencies, funds, and programs have direct and national 
participation in response to the influx of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil and how they 
interact to deliver results. 
● Describe the institutional arrangements of UN AFPs to respond to the migration crisis and 
how it allows opportunities for collaboration. 
● Present the role of international organizations - the United Nations and humanitarian relief 




After the Second World War, humanitarian efforts had limited coordinated efforts, more 
focused on Europe recuperation to the conflict. By that time, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) was the leading international humanitarian organization. In 1945, following the 
founding of the United Nations and the creation of its agencies, funds, and programs, more attention 
was brought to the coordination of humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2012). 
The first chapter of the UN Charter already perpetrates as the organization's purpose: "To 
achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character [...]" (United Nations, 1945). UN's first major decision to 
coordinate humanitarian actions was taken on 14 December 1971. General Assembly Resolution 
2816 created the figure of the Disaster Relief Coordinator: a high-level staff who directly reports 
to the UN Secretary-General and is responsible for the mobilization and coordination of 




As it will be presented in-depth further, each crisis is unique and will have a specific 
arrangement of institutions and a combination of players and challenges. The broad number of 
actors involved and human suffering are core components that require effective institutional 
mechanisms in place in order to guarantee accountability to affected populations and people in 
need. In this context, it is necessary to coordinate actions between relevant local, national, and 
international actors to respond effectively to the large scale of the humanitarian crisis of 


























2 THEORETICAL REVIEW 
 
This chapter presents how Crisis Management (CM) emerged as a relevant research topic 
in the past decades and offers a theoretical framework to describe the interaction between relevant 
actors in the context of humanitarian crisis. It also presents how crisis and underdevelopment are 
closely related and how institutions have a crucial role in its dynamic. 
It is keen to have a clear look at core concepts to have a solid theoretical framework. First 
and foremost, the difference between crisis, hazards, emergencies, and disasters should be pointed 
out since the word choice may determine the combination of decisions, methods, and policies 
applied to a particular context. In 2016, Al-Dahash, Thayaparan, and Kulatunga conducted a 
literature review to clarify which characteristics define each term. According to their work, 
although this distinction is needed, these terms are frequently "used interchangeably." When 
comparing the characteristics listed by these authors and the "features in emergency management" 
pointed by UNHCR (2007), no equivalency could be established. Therefore, it is not possible to 
find consensus and common terminology. 
With that in mind, both crisis and emergency terminologies will coexist in this paper. 
Although “emergency” is the terminology adopted by UNHCR and other United Nations AFPs 
when referring to a practical response to an urgent refugee situation, as the majority of scholars 
and research mostly lie on the concept of Crisis Management (CM), "crisis" will be prioritized in 
this text. Considering that some authors defend that a disaster is "concentrated in time and space" 
(AL-DAHASH; THAYAPARAN; KULATUNGA, 2016), this term indicates the acute phase of a 




Either natural or human-made causes will trigger a crisis. Natural causes may have a sudden 
impact on society (e.g., earthquakes and tsunamis), a slow-onset (e.g., drought, famine, and pest 
infestation), or have roots in epidemic diseases (e.g., water-borne and food-borne). On the other 
hand, human actions also trigger a crisis and are divided between those with industrial or 
technological roots (e.g., pollution, fires, spillages, and explosions) and complex emergencies (e.g., 
wars, civil strife, and armed aggression) (ANDERSON; GEBER, 2018). In 1994, the United 
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Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee6 (IASC) established a standard definition for complex 
emergencies, invoking interaction between institutions to cope with urgent humanitarian needs: 
 
A humanitarian crisis which occurs in a country, region, or society where there is 
a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from civil conflict and/or 
foreign aggression; [...] which requires an international response which goes 
beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency. (IASC, 1994) 
 
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - OCHA (1999) 
establishes four fundamental aspects of complex emergencies:  
 
● Extensive violence and loss of life; massive displacements of people; 
widespread damage to societies and economies; 
● The need for large scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance; 
● The hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political 
and military constraints; 
● Significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some 
areas. (OCHA, 1999) 
 
Humanitarian crises go through 4 phases: pre-crisis, acute, post-crisis, and recovery. In the 
pre-crisis phase, plans and guidance are established to prepare organizations for the subsequent 
phase: acute, when the outbreak of a situation triggers the crisis response system. During the post-
crisis, the mortality rate reduces, and longer-term options begin to be pursued. As the crisis comes 
to an end, the recovery phase encloses with the exit of expanding organizations (definition to be 
given forward in the text) and shift of responsibilities to local authorities (ANDERSON; GEBER, 
2018). Bynander and Nohrstedt (2020) identified four crisis trajectories, based on their on-set and 
resolution, summarized in Figure 1. 
 
 
6 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee was created by the United Nations General Assembly in 1992 to 
work as a forum for humanitarian coordination between both UN and non-UN actors involved in complex 




FIGURE 1 - Trajectories of crisis 
Source: elaborated by the author; NOHRSTEDT; BYNANDER, 2020. 
 
2.2 Crisis Management (CM) 
 
Each crisis is unique and will demand a different combination of measures, mobilization of 
actors, and institutional arrangements to comply with the needs a crisis imposes. Managing 
complex crises requires joint efforts between institutions. As the IASC definition states, no single 
institution may deliver all results and perform all actions needed to resolve a complex 
emergency/crisis. Although some accredit specific institutional architectures to effective crisis 
management, researchers affirm that an effective crisis response system is given by two core 
factors: flexibility and adequate flow of information – opposing to reliance on command and 
overflow of information (BOIN; HART, 2010). 
Crisis presents unpredictable and unstable scenarios, requiring constant and dynamic 
adjustments to cope with objectives and deliver results (BOIN; HART, 2010). Although traditional 
literature states that leadership and management become centralized in the context of crisis (HART; 
ROSENTHAL; KOUZMIN, 1993; KAPUCU; GARAYEV, 2011), this is not mandatory 
component of an effective crisis response system (BOIN; HART, 2010). By this means, both 
centralized and decentralized structures may be effective depending on the crisis. 
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The communication factor can be considered in different spheres, but culture imposes 
challenges to the interaction between teams and organizations. Communication will be 
fundamental to developing an effective crisis response network as it allows isolated mechanisms 
to act together as a whole. Barriers between institutions are considered the main challenge in most 
crises. Bringing together institutions with different mandates, objectives and aligning varied modus 
operandi requires leadership and communication/relationship lines established before the crisis.  
(BOIN; HART, 2010) 
As foreseen by the PDCA cycle (plan, do, control, act), organizations should establish plans 
to prepare relevant actors better to respond in the context of a crisis. This phase occurs when 
establishing standards – what to expect from each actor – and criteria – what to consider when 
making decisions – to reach particular objectives (CHIAVENATO, 2011). Through the study of 
good practices, Boin and Hart (2010) listed four core components of effective crisis planning: 
● A combination of generic and specific scenarios approaches and plans; 
● Establishment of activity clusters among probable crisis response actors; 
● Management of public expectations through the involvement of crisis response 
actors – including the community – and good communication between them; 
● Constant reassessment and adjustment of crisis planning should be performed 
before, during, and after a crisis. 
Recurring and small-scale crises can be significantly managed using guidance and plans 
established at the planning phase. On the other hand, some plans may not endure when applied to 
a bigger-scale crisis. This does not disqualify the importance of planning but reinforces the need to 
establish well-developed plans that offer helpful support to managers, mainly at the early and acute 
stages of a crisis (BOIN; HART, 2010). 
While a country's governance structure will be defined by multiple actors – with special 
attention given to political and economic institutions, individuals, and organizations – (AHRENS; 
RUDOLPH, 2006), the governance structure of a crisis response system will be constituted by its 
inter-organizational arrangement. Given the relation between crisis and underdevelopment, 
effective governance allows adequate interaction of actors in order to guarantee community 
resilience before and after a crisis. Knowing that governance is a powerful tool to respond to those 
realities, by the other hand, ineffective governance can be tracked as a cause of both crisis and 
underdevelopment (AHRENS; RUDOLPH, 2006). 
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Organizations part of crisis response (crisis governance structure) are divided into four 
different groups, depending on the relation of their mandate with crisis response and mechanisms 
to respond to a crisis: established, extending, expanding, and emergent organizations (DYNES, 
1970; QUARANTELLI, 1977 apud BOIN; HART, 2010; BYNANDER; NOHRSTEDT, 2020). 
 
TABLE 2 
Classification of institutions responding to a crisis. 
 The mandate of the organization 
directly relates to crisis response 
The mandate of the organization is not 





Established: first responders.  
It is characterized by its speed, public 
support, and preparation for crisis 
outbreaks. 
Extending: social services.  
Characterized by its bureaucracy and need 
to adapt its operations in the urge of a 
crisis. 
The organization 
must create new 
mechanisms to 
respond 
Expanding: international and relief 
organizations. Although their 
mandate covers crisis response, they 
are also committed to other activities 
and demands beyond crisis response. 
They support the work of extending 
organizations. 
Emerging: organizations created to 
satisfy an urgent need of a particular 
crisis. Their structures and roles tend to be 
confusing. Often add tension to the 
scenario when interacting with the other 
types of organizations. 
 
Source: elaborated by the author; DYNES (1970); QUARANTELLI (1977) apud BOIN; HART, 2010; 
BYNANDER; NOHRSTEDT, 2020. 
 
As a crisis undergoes, different categories of organizations lead the crisis response and are 
present to different extents. During the acute and initial phase of an emergency, established 
organizations occupy a fundamental and leading role. In a second phase, focus shifts to extending 
organizations as social consequences of a crisis will attract most of the attention. At this phase, 
expanding organizations also deploy personnel to support the work performed by extending 
organizations. Emerging organizations may be formed in any crisis phase, and crisis plans may 
forecast their creation. Usually, a crisis response system is overpopulated, and although emerging 
organizations play a fundamental role, it constantly puts additional tension to an already tense 
scenario (BOIN; HART, 2010). 
Nevertheless, an essential highlight in governance is that the private actors alone will not 
guarantee the delivery of socially relevant governance structures. Because of this, the public sector 
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- as we can infer, the state - must be active and present to redirect efforts if needed (AHRENS; 
RUDOLPH, 2006). This is represented chiefly by established and expanding organizations 
mentioned just above. 
Naturally, different emergencies will have different institutional arrangements and degrees 
of interaction between institutions. Leo Denise (1999) defined C-Three: communication, 
coordination, and cooperation. 
• Communication stands for the flow of information within and between 
organizations, considering actors and institutions may have varying readings of the 
same situation (DENISE, 1999); 
• Coordination stands for how processes are managed, so each part knows when and 
how to act while cutting duplicate work; it represents efficiency; 
• Cooperation is about getting to know collective needs and using individual 
perspectives to add different views and approaches to the same situation. Rather 
than performance, it focuses on the cultural aspects of organizations (DENISE, 
1999). 
Leo Denise (1999) adds a new word to the C-Three trilogy: collaboration. 
Collaboration benefits from shared information during communication, although not 
limited to it. Collaboration opposed to coordination, considering it requires flexibility rather than 
process-focused. Most importantly, "collaboration thrives on differences and requires the sparks of 
dissent," unlike cooperation (DENISE, 1999, p. 3). Governance structures of crisis often observe 
situations of discordance and conflict between institutions and categories of actors (BYNANDER; 
NOHRSTEDT, 2020). It is critical to understand that dissent constitutes a fundamental part of this 
profound degree of interaction which is collaboration; it does not disqualify collaboration in any 
way. Dissent is paramount to collaboration (DENISE, 1999). 
In 2016, Eric Martin, Isabelle Nolte, and Emma Vitolo conducted a literature review on 
research dealing with any of Four Cs in a disaster context. It mapped key characteristics mentioned 
among research papers and created the summary table below – although this paper may benefit 
from this general overlook, authors made clear consensus is yet to be achieved between scholars. 
 
TABLE 3 
Summary of key characteristics of the Four Cs. 
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 Communication Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Cost of interaction Low Medium Medium High 
Degree of 
embeddedness 
Low Medium High High 
Following of 
common goals 
Low Medium High High 
Frequency of 
interaction 
Low Medium Medium High 
Reciprocity Low Medium High High 
Shared Resources Low Medium Medium High 
Shared risk Low Medium Medium High 
Source: MARTIN et al., 2016. 
 
Martin et al. (2016) mentions that a hierarchy between these terms may be implied in some 
research, creating a kind of complexity gradient that goes from communication, grows through 
cooperation and coordination, finding its ground on collaboration. 
Communication is the most basic inter-organizational relationship, requiring primary 
efforts for interaction (MARTIN et al., 2016).  
Kettl (2003, apud MARTIN et al., 2016) states that complexity in coordination may require 
managers to break problems into different groups to facilitate management. Following Kettl's train 
of thought, this would indeed apply to collaboration to a greater extent. 
Not only can collaboration play an important role when managing a crisis, indeed it 
constitutes a fundamental role in its dynamic. Combining critical aspects of both Crisis 
Management (CM) and Collaborative Public Management (CPM) can advance comprehension 
towards another field of study: Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM). Relevant articles on 
Crisis Management (CM) linked to Collaborative Public Management (CPM) are dated from 1990 
(NOHRSTEDT et at., 2018, p. 259). Although the study of CCM has grown in the past decade, 
there is still little work on migration, refugee, and humanitarian specific matters. A basic search in 
the Scopus abstract and citation database identified only 47 documents that mentioned CCM and 
migration, migrants, refugee, refugee, or humanitarian. 
In 2020, Frederik Bynander and Daniel Nohrstedt published the first edition of the book 
"Collaborative Crisis Management: Inter-Organizational Approaches to Extreme Events". It 
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represents one of the most extensive efforts to a cohesive understanding of how collaboration can 
play a decisive role in crisis management. In the past, researchers have mobilized knowledge from 
correlated social sciences fields – collaborative governance and collaborative public management 
in particular –, but the authors are clear when stating that this field of study is full of "conceptual 
confusion". Therefore, it is keen to work towards a harmonized definition of Collaborative Crisis 
Management, which Bynander and Nohrstedt propose as: "[...] involving joint efforts of multiple 
autonomous actors to work across organizational borders, levels of authority, and sectors to prepare 
for, respond to, and learn from risks and extreme events that disrupt our modern society".  
As described, modern society is unstable, and the need for constant adaptation and 
collaboration is imposed on organizations. Although the importance of collaboration in extreme 
events is recognized, past experiences have proved that the joint work between organizations is 
complex. Considering collaboration is usually surrounded by expectations from various actors, the 
incapacity to deliver an effective response can result in frustration. Considering that researchers 
identified and deeply studied no standard collaboration configurations, equating those overlapping 
interactions is a challenge to crisis managers. Those exact expectations occur as a result of how 
"strategic development" advanced through history and was adopted by countries. From 1991, the 
world observed a transition of focus from territorial integrity to societal security, which is based 
on the close relationship between three key trends: cross-sectoral collaboration, societal resilience, 
and vulnerabilities and risk reduction (BYNANDER; NOHRSTEDT, 2020; HART; SUNDELIUS, 
2013). 
 
2.1 Crisis, Underdevelopment, and Resilience of Society 
 
There is a range of challenges, such as climate change, unplanned-urbanization, 
under-development/poverty as well as the threat of pandemics, that will shape 
humanitarian assistance in the future. These aggravating factors will result in 
increased frequency, complexity and severity of disasters. (IFRC, 2021) 
 
Vulnerability and resilience compose a continuum, therefore a linear scale of a society's 
response to a crisis and its ability to bounce back from disturbance and resist (PEARCE; LEE, 
2018). Research shows that the susceptibility of societies to crises is both cause and consequence 
of underdevelopment and poverty. Therefore, it constitutes a vicious cycle of constant and growing 
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social vulnerability (AHRENS; RUDOLPH, 2006; ACEMOGLU; ROBINSON, 2012). As crisis 
and underdevelopment can be prevented by solid national institutions and an effective governance 
system, the contrary is also correct; institutional failure and lack of effective crisis response systems 
undermine valuable assets of a society. The least developed and emerging countries would 
naturally be more susceptible to face difficulties in crisis response (AHRENS; RUDOLPH, 2006). 
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Nevertheless, the personal skills and capacities of the affected population in a humanitarian 
crisis offer an underutilized potential and capacity to drive and streamline social chance. If 
considering personal skills and capacities in social protection are essential to potentialize 
humanitarian protection (PEARCE; LEE, 2018) and underdevelopment is strongly linked to 
institutional failure (AHRENS; RUDOLPH, 2006), the institutional building should be sensible to 
the heterogenous aspect of societies. In this sense, some factors may be considered: mapping the 
potential and varied risks to which a population is susceptible, identifying protection gaps, and 
guaranteeing the high responsiveness and resilience of the system. 
Moreover, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have studied such complex dynamics in 
the book "Why Nations Fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty" (2012). This important 
research brought significant contributions, but the answer to the question proposed in the title is 
that besides many factors such as geography and culture, the catalyst of a nation's failure lies in the 
performance of national institutions. Nevertheless, behind institutional performance will be 
political affairs: the critical vector of institutional change determining its strength or weakness/ 
fragility. Following this line of thought, political events do have the power to settle which paths an 
institution will take towards either vulnerability or resilience. Thereupon, attention shall be brought 
to the potential of both political events and institutions to promote social change or, as well, the 
other way around: "institutions that create poverty generate negative feedback loops and endure" 
(ACEMOGLU; ROBINSON, 2012, p. 335). 
This analysis is vital to understand and promote social change at the national and, 
subsequently, international level. Poverty is not an unsolvable matter in society: it does have to be 
addressed strategically by evidence-based approaches. There is an uncountable number of variants 
to coordinate in a nation to prevent it from failure. However, some previous successful international 
experiences provide us rich knowledge to understand what to do – and what to do not do 




FIGURE 2: Relationship between disasters and underdevelopment 









3 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
This chapter explains what constitutes a case study and why it is presented as the ideal 
qualitative research method to answer the research question and better develop around this paper's 
general and specific objectives. It also presents which are the methodological components (layers) 
of this analysis: (1) research context, (2) case, (3) object, (4) focus, and (5) unit of analysis. In the 
end, an analytic map for data collection, processing, and analysis is offered – which works as a 
roadmap for the case study proposed in this paper. 
 
3.1 Research Strategy: Case Study 
 
According to Robert Yin (1994), case studies are a valuable tool to establish relations and 
connections between different actors and processes. Therefore,  
Robert Yin (1994) presents case studies as a research strategy through which data will be 
collected and why decisions are made. Case studies will be strategically helpful when the object 
studied constantly and dynamically interacts with the broad context it is inserted. By this means, it 
is given that a case study should cover fundamental links between the object and the context, 
establishing cause-consequence relations. This will require a combination of different investigation 
techniques; field work might also be considered, given the need to fill in knowledge gaps that such 
a complex research object may have. 
A case study researcher should present some characteristics that provide solid ground to the 
paper: great questioning, listening competencies, adaptability and flexibility to change the initial 
plan as needed, great domain of topics relevant to the research, no prior judgment over the object 
of and field of study - represented by the ability to accept and present a different hypothesis than 
initially thought (YIN, 1994). 
According to Robert Yin (1194), being a research strategy, a case study should depart from 
an investigation plan. The investigation plan acts as a roadmap that is planned to guide the research, 
maintaining focus while providing space to adjust the "research route" as the phenomena is better 
understood; it is composed of: 
• Pre-defined questions that drive the study and clearly expose which knowledge gap 
shall be filled. This was addressed at the introduction through the problem 
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statement, the general and specific objectives, and the research justification. Many 
questions can be made, but "why?" and "how?" are complementary indicators of the 
case study as the appropriate research strategy. As it will be seen, "how?" is inserted 
at the core of the research: the unit of analysis. 
• Initial propositions that may be tested, if any. Although some propositions on the 
degree of interaction between UN AFPs were made initially, some effort was made 
not to have it as part of the research, intending to avoid pre-judgment that may have 
influenced data collection and presentation of results. Once the research questions 
are broad provocations that initiate the discussion, one of the main functions of the 
initial proposition is to guide the study and to show the researcher which 
information is a priority during data collection. In this sense, this function is 
performed by the author's insertion in the environment being studies, naturally 
working as a filter and pre-knowledge that facilitates decision-making during the 
process. Also, this same "guidance function" is, in this paper, compensated at the 
introduction through a factual problem statement, general and specific objectives, 
and justification.  
• Units of analysis, which is presented at the end of this chapter through an analytical 
map. It will compose the most micro topic assessed in the research and the core of 
the analysis. The unit of analysis is the last methodological component; therefore, 
its function will be shown in depth in this same chapter. 
• A solid link between questions, data, and propositions (defined in advance or 
afterward). This is done here by the careful development of the narrative line that 
connects all layers of analysis, presents the data collected, and discusses the results. 
Also, this same chapter 3 presents an analytical map that illustrates how solid vital 
concepts and analytical categories fill each methodological component. 
• Definition of criteria and methods to interpret key findings, grounding the research 
results on objective criteria. 
 
 




Guided by the work "Methodology of Scientific Research: Guidelines for the preparation 
of a research protocol" (FONTELLES ET AL., 2009), this research is: 
• Basic and fundamental, once it focuses on the acquirement of new knowledge by 
the researcher, academic research and bachelor's degree papers included. 
• Observational, once it does not propose any intervention as a research result. 
• Qualitative, once complex social phenomena is at the center of the analysis, with 
little attention to numeric representations. 
• Both exploratory and explanatory. Any explanatory research would require solid 
exploratory grounds and already generated knowledge. Since no previous papers on 
the subject summarized all crucial matters, both fronts needed to be developed. 
• Documental research, given it, is focused on the analysis of documents. 
Nonetheless, some field research components are present, given the proximity of 
the author to the research topic. 
• Retrospective because it analyses all documents to understand what has happened 
in the past. Notwithstanding, at the discussion and the conclusion of this paper, some 
prospective components are present since some insights of the future of the 
migration crisis are presented, although it is not enough to affirm this paper has 
prospective objectives. 
 
3.3 Methodological Components 
 
Methodological components define the different layers of analysis chosen for the 
development of the research. In practical terms, it represents how a general context tapers gradually 
and affects a specific research topic (or unity of analysis, more accurately), offering a 
comprehensive perspective and guiding as a roadmap. In other words, it gives perspective and 
guarantees a smooth understanding of the relation between macro and micro matters in hand. For 





FIGURE 3 – Methodological components. 
Source: elaborated by the author. 
 
3.3.1 Research Context: Crisis, Underdevelopment, and Resilience 
 
The first methodological component is the research context, a vast and broad perspective 
around the set of factors that affect the topic; although it constitutes a fundamental part of the social 
phenomena studied, it is not the focus of the paper. 
At the same time, the core analysis of this paper will be more related to management 
concepts; the social and economic deterioration of Venezuela will always surround the discussion 
since it undeniably acts as the catalyst of the humanitarian crisis. This way, the research context 
embraces the following closely related concepts: crisis, underdevelopment, and resilience; all of 
these in relation to the humanitarian crisis of Venezuelan migrants. 
Nevertheless, solid methodological components allow us to transit smoothly between 
general (macro) to specific (micro) questions. This way, some findings on any side of the spectrum 
may produce powerful insights on the other side, contributing to the complete understanding of a 
topic. With all that in mind, after the results and discussion of the main findings, the conclusion 







3.3.2 Case: United Nations and humanitarian aid 
 
Many are the actors involved in response to the humanitarian crisis, recalling that it is not 
limited to the national territory of Venezuela. Many countries receive Venezuelan refugees and 
asylum seekers, contribute with funding and human resources, among other strategies, to diminish 
the impacts of the crisis. Institutions are also part of this, including international organizations such 
as the United Nations, the central and most known multilateral body worldwide. 
The second methodological component – the case of this research – gives us an essential 
cutout: the actor or group of actors analyzed, the United Nations System, comprising its agencies, 
funds, and programs, also known by the initials AFPs. The UN institutional ecosystem is complex 
and needs a proper introduction, explanatory information, and clarification. It will be essential to 
build a solid ground to the path that will be routed, helping to understand the following 
methodological components in depth. 
 
3.3.3 Object: United Nations Agencies, Funds, and Programmes involved in the humanitarian 
response in Brazil 
 
The third methodological component – the research object – applies a slight filter over the 
research case, yet fundamental to the development of a solid, linear, and smooth narrative to present 
the results of this paper. 
The UN System globally is composed of many AFPs covering an enormous variety of 
topics, which are anchored and escorted by their respective mandates – rooted on international 
agreements and resolutions. Naturally, not all UN AFPs have mandates closely related to 
humanitarian matters or have their activities in line with it; to the same extent, not all UN AFPs 
present in Brazil respond to the humanitarian crisis of Venezuelan migrants. It is important to 
mention that it is not necessarily harmful as it may seem at first reading, and an investigation over 
its causes and consequences must be conducted to find any conclusion. 
The cutout represented by this methodological component tackles this question, which is 
vital because it will guide the beginning of data collection and the first results in the next chapter. 
In this sense and as the theoretical review mentioned general directives as to the first step for an 
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effective Crisis Management, global directives and the mandates of UN institutions shall be used 
in order to identify which agencies, funds, and programs are these. 
Also, it defines the geographical location focus of the research. 
 
3.3.4 Focus: Crisis Management (CM) of United Nations Agencies, Funds, and Programmes in 
response to the humanitarian crisis in Brazil 
 
The following methodological component gives the cutout that defines this research as part 
of management and administration: how UNF AFPs manage the crisis. 
During the theoretical review, it was shown that Crisis Management (CM) constitutes a 
field of study within the broad field of management. It has specific characteristics, features, and 
dynamics that require appropriate management measures that should be administered in order to 
guarantee effectiveness and compliance with affected populations and people in need. Nonetheless, 
the time element is even more crucial in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, reinforcing the 
need for a great domain of CM techniques by leaders and managers in charge. As said in the second 
methodological component (case), many are the actors with which these same leaders will have to 
deal. So CM directs much attention to the relation between institutions and their interaction. This 
brings us to the most central methodological component: the unit of analysis. 
 
3.3.5 Unit of Analysis: Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM) 
 
The unit of analysis constitutes the core of the case study and the central cut-out, where all 
various broad matters contribute to the better understanding of a central micro-questions (YIN, 
1994). As methodological components functions as different layers, the unit of analysis unite all of 
them; therefore, the unit of analysis can be fully read as Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM) 
within United Nations agencies, funds, and programs involved with the response to the 
humanitarian crisis in Brazil at the light of international development and social resilience. 
Throughout the theoretical review, different degrees of institutional interaction were 
presented in a gradually growing scale of complexity: communication, coordination, cooperation, 
and collaboration. Taking collaboration within CM, Collaborative Crisis Management arises: a 
contemporary and breaking concept that has shown much room for knowledge generation. 
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Collaborative Crisis Management (CCM) is in the frontier of knowledge and state of the art of not 
only Crisis Management (CM) but Management itself. Given that CCM aggregates the latest 
tendencies in management and minimal work has been developed about it (especially in the context 
of humanitarian crisis), it may compromise the objectiveness and assertiveness of the analysis. 
Possible to affirm that this paper will not be able to rely on quantitative methods, at least in direct 
connection with the mobilized theory, considering information already gathered in the theoretical 
review. Some alternative creative analysis may be used taking advantage of the adaptability of the 
research strategy, case study. 
 
3.4 Data collection, processing, and analysis 
 
Data collection may be performed by a variety of methods and categories of data sources; 
Robert Yin defends that the following sources complement each other and may be applied to a 
different extent depending on the case study: documentation, archive register, interviews, direct 
observation, participative observation, and physical artifacts (YIN, 1994, p. 98). 
Regarding documentation and its usage as an investigation tool, Yin (1994) affirms that it 
should act to validate data. It assists the research in the understanding of a topic, although it should 
not be given as a "written fact". Contradictions between documents consulted and other data 
sources should encourage the researcher to dive deeper into a question to clarify it. Rather than 
solid truth, it should drive questioning - a primary characteristic of a case study researcher, as 
already presented in this chapter. A great advantage is that it is a stale source of information that 
holds a wide variety of references, officially records many events. Nevertheless, documentation 
can be withheld (deliberately or not), affecting the results and representing a knowledge gap. This 
would require the ability of the researcher to make other relations and creativity to find it by other 
means. 
Archival records – different from documentation – are working documents that become 
available for the use of the researcher (YIN, 1994). Not all archival records need to be for internal 
use only and can be made available to the public as a matter of convenience and depending on the 
organization/institution/group. Yin (1994) already forecasts the difficulty of access to this source 
of information due to the privacy and security of organizations. 
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Physical artifacts will comprise the analysis of physical evidence to help in the 
understanding of social relations, culture, and interaction. Case studies that most benefit from the 
use of physical artifacts are in the field of anthropology (YIN, 1994). 
Interviews are pointed by Robert Yin (1994) as the primary source of data in a case study. 
Considering that a case study will be directed to research objects related to social questions, it is 
essential to consult social actors about the facts and sometimes have their opinion and direct 
contributions. With the inputs of an "insider," the researcher is given a powerful tool to understand 
in-depth complex social phenomena. Rather than collecting objective and direct answers to the 
questions made during an interview, the ideal is to create an environment in which the respondent 
is free to give all information considered relevant to the research topic. Full interviews - around 1 
hour long - are more likely to fit this paper, given interviewees are expected to have a short amount 
of time to contribute to the research - especially when it comes to senior and high-rank officials. 
This will require from the interviewer competencies similar to the ones of great journalists; able to 
identify potential areas of interest and even suspect excess of similar information coming from the 
same group. Nevertheless, the weight of personal opinions and human memory susceptible to 
failure are important red flags (YIN, 1994). 
Direct observation is a data collection helpful technique when the researcher can be 
physically present in the context and object being studied. This allows the researcher to be in direct 
contact with relevant information, complementing other sources of information put together by 
other actors (subjected to their own "filters") (YIN, 1994). When it comes to participative 
observation, it relies on the same principles of direct observation; both are closely related and, 
many times, implemented together. Participative observation is not only a great technique to collect 
valuable information, but it is the main reason that defines a case study as the ideal research strategy 
for this paper (YIN, 1994).  
Notwithstanding, bias should always be at the center of attention, and the researcher should 
be able to identify it or tend to find other ways to double-check the information to guarantee the 
reliability of the results (YIN, 1994). Not necessarily bias should be "resolved" or "excluded", but 
whenever necessary, it should be pointed out and communicated so the audience and other 
researchers can make the best judgment over the content. 
Considering the author of this paper currently works in a UN AFP in Brazil and has worked 
in another in the past, some natural advantages may be attributed to the position occupied by the 
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researcher; a high degree of involvement with the object of the study. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that although the author is part of the UN, the institution has strict rules about the use 
of insider information. For this same reason, archive registers will be the primary data collection 
technique for this paper and will be keen to understand how institutional structures respond and 
adapted in the context of the migration crisis. In this sense, and to correspond to the deadlines to 
the submission of this paper, only public information will be utilized, mainly collected on the 
internet in the websites of UN AFPs, NGOs, governmental institutions, among others. As a natural 
consequence, no interviews and physical artifacts were part of this research; only archive registers 
of the public domain were consulted. Also, necessary to recall that all information shown in this 
paper reflects only the view of the author and does not represent the position of UN AFPs in any 
way. 
 
3.5 Analytical Map for Data Collection 
 
The analytical map below offers a detailed breakdown of how the information will be 
collected and analyzed concerning fundamental concepts presented in the theoretical review. The 
scales of the analytical map are: the methodological component, the key concept, analytical 
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FIGURE 4 – Analytical map. 















4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Recalling the theoretical framework (Chapter 2) and following the same logic proposed in 
the methodological components and layers of analysis (Chapter 3), results will be displayed from 
global to local perspectives. 
This chapter begins with the international humanitarian response system organization and 
mentions which institutions are expected to respond to the global crisis according to formal plans, 
afterward comparing to the institutions that are responding to the migration crisis of Venezuelans 
in Brazil according to official public information. In a second moment, the presence of these 
institutions in Brazil and their contributions to the migration response is described. Finally, it 
analyses which kind of interaction between institutions is observed and if collaborative 
arrangements and methods exist. 
Essential to have an initial note about which institutions will be mentioned: as the United 
Nations interact with a variety of external actors, it necessary to sometimes briefly mention how 
those interact with the UN and with the UN interinstitutional/interagency environment. Recalling 
the classification of institutions responding to a crisis as presented in Chapter 2 (established, 
extending, expanding, and emerging), the UN is part of expanding organizations. Nonetheless, 
other organizations from the same category will be mentioned to offer a comparison and idea of 
proportion regarding the UN's leverage in the group, although not in-depth. 
 
4.1 The International Humanitarian Response System and the Cluster Approach 
 
The United Nations (UN) system is broad and complex. It operates in 3 different levels: 
global and country-level; regional offices are in place for supporting functions. The UN brings 
together an enormous variety of topics that are relevant to the world. Its mandate is extensive, and 
so it is the number of UN agencies, funds, and programs (or UN AFPs), which are the internal 
mechanisms responsible for covering each specific area. From a business perspective, it would be 
some kind of conglomerate organizational structure composed of subsidiary bodies operating 
independently, although still cohesive, effective and coordinated. 
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At the global level, the UN is led by its Secretary-General (UNSG), followed by heads of 
UN AFP. (UNITED NATIONS, 2021) The summary of the United Nations system can be better 
understood with Annex A, the organizational chart. 
UN presence at the country level is led by the Resident Coordinator (RC), a senior high-
rank officer whose primary responsibility is to represent the UN and coordinate efforts of UN 
agencies, funds, and programs in a location. The RC acts as the United Nations Country Team 
(UNCT) chairperson, the group of Representatives of UN AFPs in the country. When humanitarian 
assistance is needed, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) may deploy a different professional 
to work as Humanitarian Coordinator, or the Resident Coordinator may also work also as 
Humanitarian Coordinator (UNSDG, 2019). The Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, with all 
representatives of Cluster Lead Agencies (this will be explained just ahead) and representatives of 
UN AFPs and invited NGOs, form the Country Team or the Humanitarian County Team – 
depending on the humanitarian situation in the country. Figure 5 exposes the IASC international 
humanitarian architecture, including reporting lines and coordination lines (note that these are not 
necessarily the same),  
In 1991 the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution that opened the way 
to coordination between international humanitarian response and relief organizations. It required 
the establishment of prevention and preparedness measures, stand-by capacity to guarantee 
response at early stages of emergencies (measures for rapid response and contingency funding), 
response led at country-level through the Resident Coordinator system (described below), and also 
states that appeals should unify the needs of all organizations of the humanitarian response system. 
This resolution created the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), formed by UN and non-UN 
organizations relevant to the delivery of adequate humanitarian assistance (UNITED NATIONS, 
1991). It is important to notice the attention that funding receives in the resolution, willing to 
prevent the international humanitarian response system from being obstructed by lack of financial 
resources, mainly during early stages of emergencies where immediate action is required and time 
is at its most critical moment as a critical factor. 
Following a series of consultations and evaluations of the international humanitarian 
response system, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee developed the Cluster Approach. It aims 
to decrease improvised arrangements and lack of professionalism in the international humanitarian 
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response system, ensuring effectiveness to guarantee accountability to affected populations and 
people in need (IASC, 2015) 
The Cluster Approach establishes lead humanitarian organizations of the international 
humanitarian response system: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Save the Children, World Food Programme 
(WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO) and 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (IASC, 2015). A 
brief explanation of the mandate of each organization and their response to the influx of 
Venezuelans in Brazil will be provided further in this paper. These organizations would be 
responsible for a different area of expertise; all these areas compose a complete humanitarian crisis 
response system with transparent reporting and accountability lines. 
 
 
FIGURE 5 – IASC Humanitarian Coordination Architecture. 





FIGURE 6 – Cluster lead agencies by sector. 
Source: IASC, 2015. 
 
The Cluster Approach was assessed by two evaluations. The first was conducted in 2007 
by an independent professional evaluation team. It concluded that the strategy made valuable 
contributions to the international humanitarian response system and its ability to act more 
integrated and with unity as it was initially aimed. On the other hand, it identified much fragility 
and space for improvement. It marked leadership as an important topic of concern, requiring more 
training and preparation for Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators about the strategy itself. Also, it 
concluded that in the first two years of implementation, UN cluster lead agencies had yet to 
institutionalize the Cluster Approach into their operations to have it as a solid and determinant 
institutional strategy. The general impression was that it served much more as a mandatory system 
in which relevance was weakly recognized in the field, and by most humanitarian staff, it needed 
to get involved. Anyhow, the research team mainly collected positive comments of actors involved 
in the Cluster Approach implementation and recommended its continuity and constant 
42 
 
development towards an improved humanitarian crisis response strategy. The evaluation 
summarized the general opinion in the following quote: "effective humanitarian response is too 
important to be left to goodwill and the right assortment of personalities" (STODDARD et al., 
2007, p. 45). 
In respect to the comments of the evaluation around leadership, it was somewhat directed 
to the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator system. Combining both the position of the Resident 
Coordinator and the Humanitarian Coordinator, deploying only one professional may bring 
benefits to the humanitarian response. This way, it is expected to have more precise reporting lines 
and a better flow of information. This configuration "pits the need for strong humanitarian 
credentials and independent authority against the need to maintain strong working relations with 
government counterparts" (STODDARD et al., 2007, p. 43). 
 
The potential for mutually beneficial interactions between the cluster approach 
and the Humanitarian Coordinator system remains largely unexplored. 
Interactions between clusters and financing mechanisms to date are mostly 
strongly positive, but negative examples highlight substantial risks when clusters 
and funding mechanisms are too closely intertwined. (STREETS et al., 2010, p. 
39) 
 
The second evaluation of the Cluster Approach was released in 2010. As well in the 2007 
evaluation, 2010 evaluation mentioned the lack of managerial capacity and training of cluster 
coordinators. It mentioned the need to raise financial resources to allow better coverage, although 
it may cause tension among actors. Also, it recognized that some improvement was observed, 
resulting in better leadership, especially in relation to coordination abilities and competencies. The 
typical response to priority gaps and improvement areas is mentioned as a significant aspect of the 
implementation of the strategy, which clusters lead agencies use to reassess the results and jointly 
foster solutions. As a significant risk, the second evaluation of the cluster approach reinforces that 
effectiveness may be compromised if managerial capacities and coordination/collaboration is not 
used as intended, at the cost of aggravating the delicate situation of affected populations. 
(STREETS et al., 2010). 
According to OCHA, both independent evaluations provided major inputs to the 




4.2 Cluster lead agencies and their presence in Brazil 
 
As forecasted by CM theory, general norms exist to facilitate planning and immediate 
response, which can be reviewed and adjusted depending on the specific situation at hand. 
Table 4 compares which are the Cluster lead agencies according to the Cluster Approach 
and which institutions, in fact, are acting to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Brazil. Table 4 
was formulated with the information in the last 5W Report from the R4V Platform, dated from 
May 2020 (R4V), divided by areas of interest/action/accountability.  
Worth mentioning that the document made no direct mentioning of the Cluster Approach 
original structure. The following clusters are not mentioned: early recovery, emergency 
telecommunications, and logistics. At the same time, new activity areas are mentioned, therefore 
new clusters: child protection, human trafficking, humanitarian transportation, and non-food items. 
Albeit not clear, there is strong evidence leading to the understanding that the UN System had 
reorganized the Cluster basic structure to respond to this humanitarian crisis. (R4V, 2020) 
Relevant to mention that many of these same cluster activities are also performed by the 
Brazilian government to a considerable extent through "Operação Acolhida"; it acts as a task force 
working in the following fronts: border control, refuge, and interiorization. (BRAZIL, 2021) 
 
TABLE 4  
Comparative table between lead organizations as cluster approach plan and actual organizations 
responding. 
Cluster Lead organizations according to 
the Cluster Approach plan 
Organizations responding 





Child Protection - UNHCR 
Cáritas Arquidiocesana do 
Rio de Janeiro 
UNICEF 
Early Recovery UNDP Not possible to identify 
Education UNICEF 
Save the Children 
UNHCR 





Emergency Telecommunications WFP Not possible to identify 




Cáritas Arquidiocesana do 
Rio de Janeiro 




Health WHO ASAV Brazil 
Cáritas Arquidiocesana do 
Rio de Janeiro 
IOM 
UNICEF 
Human Trafficking - IOM 
Humanitarian Transportation - UNHCR 
ASAB Brazil 
IOM 
Logistics WFP Not possible to identify 
Non-Food Items - UNHCR 
ASAV Brazil 
Cáritas Arquidiocesana do 
Rio de Janeiro 






Nutrition UNICEF UNICEF 
Protection UNHCR UNHCR 
Cáritas Arquidiocesana do 
Rio de Janeiro 





Cáritas Arquidiocesana do 
Rio de Janeiro 





Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene 
(WASH) 
UNICEF UNICEF 
Source: elaborated by the author; R4V, 2020; UNICEF, 2021. 
 
In fact, the R4V 5W Report (Who does What, Where, When, and for Whom) mentioned 
previously is a direct response of the team to the recommendations of the second evaluation of the 
Cluster Approach (2010). Initially, “Who does What Where” (3W), the information management 
tool used by OCHA to include simple – although critical – information, suffered slight adaptation 
to include “when” and “for whom” indicators. Among key findings of the evaluation, the 3W was 
described as having insufficient information to influence the decision in the field, recommending 
adding “when and how”. Through better information sharing, clusters may “become more effective 
and efficient in their operations by improving their management and implementation modalities” 
(STREETS et al., 2010, p. 80). 
The operational complexity of each cluster has an uncountable number of variants. They 
are inspired by the information provided in the R4V 5W Report (Who does What, Where and for 
Whom), three key variants were selected and combined below, illustrating operational complexity: 
number of implementing partners, number of beneficiaries (in thousands), and locations where 
activities were taking place. Selected reports are from February 2020 (last month before the first 
reported case of COVID in Brazil) and from July 2020 (last R4V 5W Report available on the 
website) to offer a comparison between pre-COVID and post-COVID scenarios. 
As it can be observed in Figure 8, most clusters reduced their complexity during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, with a highlight to the Protection Cluster – a more significant variation 
among all. Most clusters that observed an increased complexity during the pandemic have a direct 
relation to the sanitary emergency, like Health, Nutrition, and WASH (water, sanitation, and 
hygiene) (R4V, 2020). Important to note that this is closely related to the closure of Brazilian 
borders due to the pandemic. From March 2020 until April 2021 (date of finalization of this paper), 
if no individual exception was granted, Venezuelan migrants and refugees only enter the Brazilian 
territory irregularly. (UNHCR, 2021) 
When it comes to the disastrous mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil, it 
represents a severe impact on Venezuelan migrants. Closed borders affect all migrants’ access to 
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fundamental rights and seek assistance, even if not directly affected and contaminated by SARS-
COV-2. 
 
The pandemic in Brazil entered its worst stage so far, with a daily death toll 
averaging 3,000 by end-March, while the government worked to ensure a steady 
flow of vaccines as part of its immunization schedule. Several state healthcare 
systems were reported to be at maximum capacity or already collapsed, with ICU 
occupation rates above 90 percent, and the border remained closed at Pacaraima 
for the month of March. Bolivia also closed its border with Brazil; Argentina 
suspended all flights from Brazil, Chile, and Mexico out of fears of a “second 
wave”; Uruguay noted a rise in COVID-19 cases linked to the identification of 
the Brazilian strain in 7 departments of the country; and the case rate soared in 
Paraguay, with the health system under strain, although its borders remained open 
albeit with stricter implementation of entry requirements, and new movement 
restrictions enacted on 27 March. […] Increased military forces along borders in 
Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and Chile impeded access to territory and protection for 
Venezuelans fleeing their country. […] At the end of March, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) called on governments to maintain a 
human rights approach to border management. (R4V, 2021, p.1) 
 
Nevertheless, Venezuelan migrants already in the Brazilian territory still face relevant 
challenges in the recognition and access to fundamental rights. 
 
In Brazil, rising numbers of homeless and undocumented Venezuelans in Boa 
Vista prompted the reactivation of the Nova Canaã shelter to receive members of 
indigenous populations in an effort coordinated between R4V partners and the 
Government-led Operation Welcome. Meanwhile, the BV8 Transit Centre, which 
shelters newly arrived vulnerable individuals, reached its capacity of 1,000 
persons in February. R4V partners also installed Refugee Housing Units (RHUs) 
and set up a COVID-19 isolation area at the 13 de Setembro Emergency Site in 





FIGURE 7 – Operational complexity of each cluster according to 3 selected variants, before and during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Source: elaborated by the author; R4V, 2020. 
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In addition, according to the R4V Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for 2021 
and as illustrated in figure 7, 71% of all financial resources required in the plan are expected to be 
mobilized by UN agencies, funds, and programs, 23% by international NGOs related to religious 
groups, other categories of institutions summed up 6% (international NGOs not related to religious 
groups, national social organizations related or not to religious groups, and social movements) 
(R4V, 2020). It reiterates the leading role played by UN AFPs, mainly UNHCR, IOM, and 
UNICEF. Each AFP has its funding mechanisms (compulsory/mandatory donations from member 
states, individual donations, and private partnerships), representing the ability of the UN to 
mobilize resources, deliver humanitarian assistance, and implement programs. 
 
 
FIGURE 6 – Financial requirements by organization for the year 2021. 
Source: elaborated by the author; R4V, 2020. 
 
In October 2020, the UNCT in Brazil was formed by 29 members: The Resident 
Coordinator Ad Interim Marlova Jovchelovitch Noleto, an RC Office Team Leader, a Programme 
Communications and Advocacy Officer, and 26 UN AFPs Representatives. Refer to Appendix A 
to a complete list of UNCT members – including AFP name, name of Representative, and official 
position name – as of April 2021. It is noted that only one organization had an interim 
representative. Also, it is noted that the representative of UNDRR for the UNCT in Brazil acts 
mainly as the Regional Director of the organization (UNDG, 2020).  
Most UN agencies, funds, and programs have a central and national office in Brasília, the 
capital; some of these offices are in the UN House, the iconic UN building in Brazil. It hosts nine 
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different bodies: The Resident Coordinator Office, UNDP, UNV, UNDSS, Montreal Protocol, 
UNAIDS, UNFPA, UN Woman, and UN Environment (EXAME, 2011; ONU MULHERES, 
2015). In 2015, approximately 200 staff worked on-site (UNAIDS BRASIL, 2015). Other offices 




FIGURE 9 – United Nations House in Brazil (Brasília, Federal District). 
Source: United Nations Information Center, 2020. 
 
The Cluster Approach was established with respect to the core abilities of UN AFPs and 
other international organizations; therefore, having a clear look at its mandates is critical to 
understand their roles in the international crisis response system; to follow the mandate and briefly 
expose cluster lead agencies presence in Brazil this will be presented from this point on. 
 
4.2.1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
 
In December 1949, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution for the creation of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, beginning operations on 1 January 1951. It 
recognized that a refugee situation should be addressed by whether the “voluntary repatriation” of 
the individual or its refuge in a country other than its origin. Also, it mentions the critical role the 
UN occupies within the international community to protect refugees. Its creation was subjected to 
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an assessment by the end of 1953 to decide whether to renew the UNHCR mandate for a more 
extended period or not (UNITED NATIONS, 1949). Although the UN is formed by governments 
and naturally interact with their political views, the UNHCR Statue affirms that “the work of the 
High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and 
social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees”. It also recalls that all 
activities are subjected to the approval and cooperation of the country of concern (UNITED 
NATIONS, 1950, p.46). In the same year, UNHCR began its operations, the international 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was approved, reaffirming key roles to be performed 
by the High Commissioner before the international community and establishing the 
groundbreaking standard definition of a refugee (UNITED NATIONS, 1951). 
UNHCR is present in Brazil since 1982 (UNHCR, 2021). It has a national office in Brasília, 
supported by subnational offices in São Paulo, São Paulo; Manaus, Amazonas; and Boa Vista, 
Roraima (UNHCR, 2021). 
According to recent vacancy announcements, UNHCR has recently established a Private 
Sector Partnership Unit with the aim to raise and mobilize funds from private institutions to the 
migration response. The institution is seeking even more funding and organizing its institutional 
structure to observe growth in private funds by 2025. This illustrates that the institution is interested 
in not only keeping active but growing its activities in the context of the migration crisis in Brazil.7 
According to the Cluster Approach, UNHCR is responsible for the following clusters: 
Camp Coordination and Camp Management cluster (in conjunction with IOM), Protection, and 
Shelter (in conjunction with IFRC). 
 
4.2.2 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
 
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has worked since 1951 in order to 
guarantee a human rights-based approach to migration. It is an international organization with 173 
member states, working across the world with key actors to accomplish its mandate (IOM, 2020). 
IOM is internally organized to cover a variety of relevant topics in the field of migration: “labor 
and facilitated migration, migration and development, counter-trafficking, assisted voluntary 
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return, migration health, assistance for vulnerable migrants, immigration and border management 
and overall capacity-building in migration management”. Climate change and its relation to 
migration is also a topic covered by IOM (IOM, 2020). Regarding what it might appear, IOM was 
not part of the United Nations until 2016; IOM became one of its specialized agencies following 
the unanimous approval of the UN General Assembly (IOM, 2016). 
According to the Cluster Approach, the International Organization for Migration is 
responsible for the cluster of Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) in conjunction 
with UNHCR. 
Dialogue between the government of Brazil and IOM in order to begin international 
cooperation started only in 2004. OIM opened its first office in the country in 2016, in Brasília, 
where it coordinates action in other 11 cities it is present: Belém, Belo Horizonte, Boa Vista, 
Curitiba, Florianópolis, Manaus, Pacaraima, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. 
According to information from 2020, OIM has more than 160 staff working in Brazil (IOM, 2020). 
 
4.2.3 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was created on 22 November 1965 
by the agglutination of the already existing Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for 
Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries and the Special Fund. The Expanded 
Programme's full name by itself explains its mandate; the Special Fund was established to 
congregate resources to urgent and large development projects. The agglutination aimed to simplify 
and strengthen efforts of the UN to the assistance of underdeveloped countries and contribute to 
their growth. Rearranging these structures into a unified body was considered keen to the effective 
delivery of development programs and leveraging fundraising at the same time (UNITED 
NATIONS, 1958; UNITED NATIONS, 1965). 
UNDP has a national office in Brasília and subnational offices in five cities in Brazil: 
Salvador, São Paulo, Teresina, and Belém. UNDP actions in the country are guided by a 
Programme Document - PD approved by its Executive Board at Headquarters and the government 




“People: inclusive and equitable society with extensive rights for all men 
and women. […] Planet: sustainable management of natural resources for 
present and future generations. […] Prosperity: prosperity and quality of 
life for everyone. […] Peace: peaceful, fair and inclusive society” 
(UNITED NATIONS, 2016) 
 
According to the Cluster Approach, the United Nations Development Programme is 
responsible for the cluster of Early Recovery. [participation in the migration response] 
 
4.2.4 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
 
Responding to a request made by the UN Economic and Social Council, the UN General 
Assembly approved a resolution establishing the United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) on 11 December 1946. In the context of the post-Second World War, 
the resolution takes notice of the urgent need for relief work for children, adolescents, and their 
mothers. The emergency fund would congregate all resources voluntarily made available by the 
government, institutions, individuals, and any other potential donor. Activities performed by the 
fund in a country shall occur in a joint agreement with its governmental authority (UNITED 
NATIONS, 1946). Initially, it worked on countries' victims of aggression during the war, but four 
years later, its mandate was extended to cover children, adolescents, and mothers worldwide 
(UNITED NATIONS, 1950). On 6 October 1953, the UNGA recognized its valuable contributions 
made by the emergency fund to the overall situation of children and decided to make it a permanent 
entity of the UN system. Its name changed to United Nations Children’s Fund, although 
maintaining the acronym UNICEF (UNITED NATIONS, 1953). 
In Brazil, UNICEF national office is installed in Brasília, the capital; it has zone offices in 
9 cities: Belém, Boa Vista, Fortaleza, Manaus, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, São Luís, São 
Paulo. Those offices are responsible for the development of projects in near states: UNICEF covers 
22 of the 26 Brazil federative units. The organization has the following institutional division: 
communications and partnerships, private fundraising and partnerships, social policy, monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E), education, health and HIV/AIDS, child protection, and adolescents and 
youth participation (UNICEF, 2021). 
53 
 
According to the Cluster Approach, the United Nations Children’s Fund is responsible for 
the following clusters: Education (in conjunction with Save the Children), Nutrition, and WASH. 
 
4.2.5 Save the Children 
 
Save the Children is an international non-governmental organization (NGO) focused on 
safeguarding child rights with a strong presence in response to humanitarian emergencies 
worldwide. It focuses on survival, learning, and protection of children from violence; its mission 
is “to inspire breakthroughs in the way the world treats children and achieve immediate and lasting 
change in their lives” (SAVE THE CHILDREN, 2019). 
Save the Children is responsible for the Education cluster (in conjunction with UNICEF) 
according to the Cluster Approach plan. It was not possible to find reliable information that 
confirms its presence in Brazil since its global website has conflicting information. Although it 
affirms that Save the Children has been working in the fields of children survival, education, and 
emergency response in Brazil since 1991, the country is not listed in the updated list of 
programmatic locations. The list mentions only three countries of South America where programs 
are implemented: Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Also, no information was found regarding the 
deployment of any financial resource from Save the Children in the country; neither was found a 
dedicated website of the organization to Brazil (SAVE THE CHILDREN, 2021). This information 
was confirmed in consultation with a UN national officer and with a consultant, both directly 
involved with the response to the migration crisis. 
 
4.2.6 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was created on 16 October 1945 as a result 
of the international preoccupation with food and starvation caused by the mass destruction of the 
Second World War. FAO is a specialized agency part of the UN system and is entitled to work on 
all necessary fronts to enhance the wealth of people through good nutrition and the efficient 
delivery of food to populations in need (FAO, 2020). 
FAO is present in Brazil since 1949; it has a national office in Brasília and a decentralized 
unit in Curitiba dedicated to project management and proximity with relevant actors of the south 
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region of Brazil (FAO, 2021). Although the Food and Agriculture Organization is responsible for 
the cluster of Food and Security (in conjunction with WFP), no information was identified in its 
website nor UN Brazil website regarding programmatic action to respond to the influx of 
Venezuelan migrants in Brazil. 
 
4.2.7 World Food Programme (WFP) 
 
The World Food Programme (WFP) was established by the UN General Assembly on 19 
December 1961 as a pilot project of, initially, three years between the UN and FAO. Its main 
objective was to deliver food worldwide as part of humanitarian aid efforts to fight hunger and 
malnutrition (UNITED NATIONS, 1961). WFP was renewed in 1965, being now a continuing 
entity of the UN system with its mandate, activities, and need to be reassessed regularly (UNITED 
NATIONS, 1965). In 2020, WFP was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize “for its efforts to combat 
hunger, for its contribution to bettering conditions for peace in conflict-affected areas and for acting 
as a driving force in efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war and conflict” (NOBEL 
MEDIA AB, 2020). 
WFP national office is in Brasília, the capital, and is a Centre of Excellence against Hunger. 
It facilitates international public policy dialogue through the Trilateral South-South Cooperation 
strategy8, focusing on specifics needs to combat hunger in Africa, Latin America, and Asia (WFP, 
2021). According to the Cluster Approach plan, the World Food Programme is responsible for the 
following clusters: Emergency Telecommunications, Food Security (in conjunction with FAO), 
and Logistics. Despite this, no information was found on the Brazilian website of the institution 
(2021) and the last R4V 5W Report (Who does What Where, When, and for Whom) from May 
2020 regarding any WFP programmatic participation or implementation in the context of the 
Venezuelan migrant crisis in Brazil. 
 
 
8 Through South-South Cooperation two or more developing countries interact in the aim to fulfill a certain objective, 
using a variety of available resources (financial, knowledge, specialized personnel, etc) and calling for the participation 
of key actors/institutions. Trilateral South-South Cooperation happens when this dialogue and interaction is facilitated 




4.2.8 World Health Organization (WHO) 
 
In 1903, the idea of the first permanent international health organization appeared during 
the International Sanitary Conference of that year. The International Office of Public Health started 
functioning in 1908. When the League of Nations - an international organization predecessor to the 
UN - was created after the First World War, a second international health organization was created, 
and both contributed with each other. After the end of the Second World War, representatives from 
Brazil and China once again brought to the attention the need to create a unified international health 
organization (WHO, 2020). On 22 June 1946, UN member states agreed on the Constitution of the 
World Health Organization, which defined the modern concept of health as “a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (WHO, 
1946, p.1). The Constitution also established a series of responsibilities of national authorities, 
spaces for specialized and technical international cooperation. The WHO hosts a session of the 
World Health Assembly annually, when decisions regarding the positioning of WHO are adopted 
and conventions and agreements are firmed, among other activities that contribute to world health 
(WHO, 1946). 
WHO is installed in Brasília, and its office also acts as a regional office to the Americas. It 
also congregates PAHO, the Pan-American Health Organization, an international health 
organization focused on the Americas and part of the UN System as well (OPAS, 2021). 
According to the Cluster Approach plan, the World Health Organization is responsible for 
the Health cluster. 
 
4.2.9 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
 
The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is an 
organization that acts “in response to emergencies and at the same time promotes respect for 
international humanitarian law and its implementation in national law”. The IFRC is not a single 
organization; it is formed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and 191 National Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies acting in different countries. All those are united by a series of humanitarian principles 
and the common goal to assist populations in need of humanitarian assistance (IFRC, 2020). 
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IFRC has a regional delegation installed in Brasília responsible for institutional presence 
and support not only in Brazil but in countries of the South Cone: Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay (CICV, 2021). 
According to the Cluster Approach plan, the International Federation of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies is responsible for the Shelter cluster (in conjunction with UNHCR). 
 
4.3 Collaborative Crisis Management: United Nations response to the influx of Venezuelan 
migrants in Brazil 
 
First, and before directly introducing discussion points on collaborative arrangements, we 
shall deliberate on the phase of the humanitarian crisis. This is because a crisis in an on-set phase 
will have completely different factors in relation to a crisis that is already heading to its resolution, 
for instance. Society recovery, for example, is a significant point of attention when reaching crisis 
off-set, which is not the case for a “still-in-development” crisis. As organizations are constantly 
responding to external stimuli, their activities will be directly affected by the external scenario. 
In this sense, preliminary findings indicate that UN entities progress towards an increase in 
their humanitarian presence and activities in Brazil. This is demonstrated by the high frequency of 
job opportunities advertised by UNHCR, IOM, and UNICEF – the 3 UN agencies with the most 
representative budget requirements for 2021, as per Figure 7. Not only hiring of local professionals 
seems to observe constancy, but especially those positions to fundraising and donor relations. In 
fact, multiple terms of reference publicized by these AFPs between 2020 and 2021 directly mention 
the institutional effort to improve fundraising. For instance, UNHCR’s terms of references often 
mention its PSP – Private Sector Partnership area, created in 2017 (worth mentioning, the same 
period of the outbreak of the humanitarian crisis). Although not necessarily all resources raised 
within Brazil will be utilized locally, no doubt it constitutes strong evidence of the institutional 
effort to enhance its financial capacities – consequently, also its ability to respond locally. 
With this, it is given a clear look around the “institutional momentum” of the UN in Brazil 
– or tendencies for institutional presence. Studying the response of a complex institutional system 
such as the UN gives us important hints about the present and future of the humanitarian crisis, 
also allowing appropriate response measures (and institutional interaction) to the best interest of 
affected populations. Having the classification of institutions responding to a crisis seen in the 
57 
 
theoretical review recalled, expanding organizations are the first to exit a crisis scene. Their work 
complements the work of extending organizations – mostly governmental structures – and, as a 
crisis gets closer to the recovery phase, social services and other relief work are not needed to the 
same extent as previously in acute phases. 
Even though the influx of Venezuelan migrants to Brazil now occurs at a significantly lower 
rate in comparison to rates of the past few years, the presence of expanding organizations in 
response to the influx of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil is currently still on the rise. Decreased 
influx rates are imputed over closed international borders in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic 
(as mentioned in more depth in subchapter 4.2) and should not be considered as an indicator of the 
crisis off-set of the crisis. In fact, it acts as a “symptom” of an aggravating factor that is already 
worsening the humanitarian situation and will have severe consequences on affected populations. 
The influx of Venezuelans to Brazil is likely to get back to previous rates – or even increase 
– once the Brazilian border reopens and formal migration routes are reestablished. Considering all 
crisis aspects foresaid, it fits what Bynander and Nohrstedt (2020) named “slow-burning crisis”, 
which is characterized by gradual onset, followed by a subsequent phase that does not develop the 
crisis to a resolution; instead, it “fades away”. It is a situation in which the crisis has been happening 
for so long that society gets used to it. However, aid is still keen. 
As seen previously, the international humanitarian crisis response system is designed in a 
way it requires close interaction between institutions (which can be characterized as 
communication, cooperation, coordination, or collaboration: the 4 Cs), establishing clear 
accountability lines. The most appropriate interaction degree will be defined in accordance with its 
context and environment, meaning none is considered a definitive must. Each one of the 4 Cs will 
require a different allocation of institutional resources (personnel, economic, and infrastructure, for 
instance) to guarantee its fulfillment. In the field of crisis management and humanitarian assistance 
– where resources are minimal and, in most cases, insufficient – managing inter-institutional 
interaction is keen to deliver the most needed aid in the most influential fashion and guarantee 
accountability to affected populations. 
When it comes to the analysis of the degree of interaction among humanitarian institutions, 
an important fact should be brought to attention: the impermanence of the object being analyzed. 
In an always-changing environment, depending on the timeframe, different “portraits” of the same 
object may come as a result. Institutions are constantly reassessing their own operations and 
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readjusting intra/inter-institutional mechanisms to better respond to external stimulus. This is 
potentialized during a crisis when time-sensitiveness counts as the primary root for pressure among 
staff. In this paper, the timeframe of the analysis comprehends the period from 2016 – when the 
Venezuelan crisis worsened and the influx of Venezuelan migrants began to be more expressive in 
Brazil – to the first quarter of 2021 – cut-out date for practical research reasons. 
Another point for attention is to not fall into the trap of using individual micro-scenarios to 
characterize the general context. The analytical map has robust and specific cut-outs, but the last 
(unit of analysis) should be followed to the best of its extent. In this paper, it was made the decision 
to focus on CCM among UN AFPs involved in response to the influx of Venezuelan migrants in 
Brazil. For practical methodological guidance, this requires the analysis of national mechanisms of 
the institutions. If brought to a business administration perspective, the focus would be on strategic 
and tactic matters, leaving operational aspects. This does not mean operations will not be 
mentioned, but it does not constitute a central topic; thus, it is mentioned in this paper to 
demonstrate how strategic and tactic teams act to facilitate operational matters. Such disclaimer is 
key to avoid methodological mistakes and, consequently, creating precipitate results because of 
juggling both the broad context and limited/individual/micro cases incorrectly. 
That said, we may turn to the analysis of crisis management arrangements and institutional 
interaction within UN agencies, funds, and programs in Brazil. It will be driven by the discussion 
around the cost of interaction, degree of embeddedness, following of common goals, frequency of 
interaction, reciprocity, shared resources, and shared risk – key characteristics of the Four Cs 
(MARTIN et al., 2016). Therefore, the linear scale of communication, cooperation, coordination, 
and collaboration will be explored as each component is presented. 
Conscious of the unfolding resolution and persisting humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and 
neighboring countries, the United Nations Secretary-General requested the creation of the Regional 
Inter-Agency Coordination Platform – R4V (the acronym that stands for “Response for 
Venezuelans”). R4V represents a milestone for deepening the interaction between cluster lead 
agencies and, generally, all institutions responding to the migration crisis in Brazil actively. R4V 
online site contains a wide variety of documents, including assessments, contact lists, COVID-19 
related material, real-time dashboards, factsheets, data, statistics, funding numbers and balances, 
media reports, meeting minutes, national refugee response plans, situation reports and analysis, 




“Taking into account participants in the national platforms, more than 170 
actors collaborate in this coordinated regional response. They collaborate 
through several coordination support working groups (on information 
management, communication/fundraising) and other product-oriented 
working groups (support spaces, gender based-violence, communication 
with communities, and integration.” (R4V, 2021) 
 
R4V constantly promotes joint meetings between relevant actors in various areas/topics of 
concern (R4V, 2021). According to information made available in the R4V platform, on 21st June 
2020, the 12th Regional Platform Meeting happened with 200 different people. During the meeting, 
different planning scenarios were ventilated for planning purposes, considering which specific 
impacts would be observed in which case and necessary measures (R4V, 2020). Different 
organizational levels seem to be involved in activities promoted by R4V, from UN high-rank 
officials, to AFPs leadership in Brazil, national technical teams, and local staff in the field. 
In December 2020, R4V released the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan 
covering the year 2021. It establishes general needs and priorities for Venezuelan migrants and 
refugees in Venezuela and neighboring countries, including Brazil. This plan covers a variety of 
topics, including background and situation analysis, programmatic activities and priorities by area, 
populations of concern, funding gaps and needs, and, most important to this paper: the role of 
partnerships and coordination to accomplish the success of the plan. It listed a total of 158 
organizations involved with the migration response in South America; among them are UN AFPs, 
international organizations, local NGOs, and national committees. Besides not being mentioned, 
governments are always considered since it is their primary responsibility to assist migrants and 
refugees according to international humanitarian law (R4V, 2020). 
Many hints on the degree of inter-institutional interaction between UN AFPs in Brazil can 
be taken from R4V documents and how it reports joint activities. In summary, it seems to endorse 
that most critical characteristics of the Four Cs are present at a high level. 
Starting from the following of common goals, it constitutes the most substantial factor 
identifiable in the R4V platform among Four Cs characteristics, the primary evidence of this being 
the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan. It summarizes challenges and indicates how 
each institution (UN entity or not) will be responsible for delivering humanitarian assistance and 
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how people in need will be targeted. Having this information organized not only formalizes 
common goals that should be followed in an objective manner but, most importantly, serves as a 
roadmap guiding institutional efforts in a scenario of uncertainty. Thus, it facilitates the 
accomplishment of the mandate of the UN and of each institution. 
Following common goals will be closely related to the degree of embeddedness 
(interinstitutional “stickiness” to proposed strategy and to collective agreements, formal or not). 
Recalling a point that was just mentioned in the paragraph above, a crisis is a scenario of 
uncertainty. Consequently, although keen to embrace flexibility, some core aspects of the response 
shall be solid and not frequently change. It serves as an anchor to humanitarian staff in some way, 
facilitating overall performance and program implementation. Also, it aims to guarantee that no 
ineffectiveness will occur because of the lack of management of interinstitutional work. R4V shows 
strong evidence that embeddedness to common strategies is observed in the context of UN 
humanitarian activities in Brazil. 
As a matter of fact, as most of these institutions are under the umbrella of the UN System 
and respond to the UN Resident Coordinator in Brazil, it indicates that these same institutions are 
highly likely to stick to the joint agreements and strategies. Also, national websites of key UN 
AFPs in Brazil have demonstrated to have monitoring and evaluation activities and dedicated staff 
to perform these functions. Monitoring and evaluation activities actively look up to the external 
scenario and analyze it, but also to look to the organization itself and confront targets and results. 
It is a quality assurance mechanism directly acting over the degree of embeddedness and following 
of common goals. In this context, no evidence of joint monitoring and evaluation mechanisms – 
standard M&E services – was identified. As per the available public information, each organization 
seems to contribute to joint M&E activities through internal already-existing institutional structures 
and staff. 
When it comes to reciprocity among institutions, documents from R4V reinforce that it 
happens, but to a limited extent. Oxford Languages (2021) online dictionary defines reciprocity as 
“the practice of exchanging things with others for mutual benefit, especially privileges granted by 
one country or organization to another.” According to this definition, it is possible to affirm that 
reciprocity is present in the humanitarian crisis response system developed to and in effect in 
Brazil. Most benefits brought by UN AFPs are related to the image of the UN and its access to 
national and international political actors. Also, the UN brings many benefits brought by such a 
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sizeable institutional structure, such as funding and recognized technical expertise. On the other 
hand, NGOs and other non-UN institutions tend to act closer to the field and the affected 
population, holding more knowledge on the operationalization of the humanitarian response. Some 
of these NGOs are local non-governmental organizations, as shown in Figure 7 (financial 
requirements by organization for the year of 2021) while representing less than 3% of financial 
requirements. 
Preliminary analysis of the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan in conjunction 
with other R4V documents indicates that United Nations AFPs and other R4V partner institutions 
experience mutual and complimentary benefits due to their joint work; therefore, reciprocity. It 
seems to be more present at the strategic level (represented by national offices) and those 
responsible for interacting with regional and global teams rather than at the operational level (field 
presence). 
Risk is a significant point of attention. To illustrate, simple word tracking identified “risk” 
being mentioned 329 times in the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan – RRMRP for 
2021 (R4V, 2020). For comparison, the version of this strategy for the year 2020 mentioned “risk” 
213 times (R4V, 2019), while in the document for 2019 only 55 times (UNHCR, 2018). Although 
in most cases, risks are mentioned not about operational aspects of institutional activities 
concerning risks suffered by Venezuelan migrants, it still relates to core functions of these 
humanitarian organizations. Any risk suffered by Venezuelan migrants as a group also configures 
a risk to R4V partners and the United Nations System's effectiveness in the field. As per the second 
evaluation of the Cluster Approach, most risks inflects over joint meetings, allocation of resources, 
partnerships, financing mechanisms, among other joint actions (STREETS et al., 2010). 
The last Four Cs’ factor to be explored with evidence collected in R4V, shared resources. 
Although the number of shared resources managed jointly is not easily identifiable – since it would 
require information in the public domain such as accountant classification that is not available –, 
R4V reveals growing numbers when comparing humanitarian funding over the past years. As a 
direct result, expected that institutional resources required to manage this funding would grow 
accordingly. At least, the organization is likely to suffer pressure to do so. Anyhow, still not 
possible to affirm if resource sharing occurs at a high or low rate. More details around resource-
related matters to be mentioned further up when other information will be explored whilst not 
limited to R4V. 
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In summary, preliminary analysis of information available in the R4V platform highly tends 
to indicate collaborative arrangements at the national level (more strategic and political-related). 
At the same time, it tends to signalize that the operational level represented by UN presence in the 
field is closer to somewhat between cooperation and coordination. 
R4V seems to work mainly as a space for broad information sharing: through the repository 
of public documents in the website, through official information shared during internal meetings, 
or even informally through communication lines between staff from different institutions. How this 
information is used for public and internal use serves as a central topic of analysis to configure 
which is the degree of interaction between institutions. This is because the flux of information may 
be architected to stimulate or even require interaction between actors. Also, documents can 
objectively indicate the intensity of each characteristic of the 4Cs, such as frequency of interaction, 
shared resources, and following common goals. 
Bringing into consideration the second evaluation of the Cluster Approach: “information 
management and institutional memory remain a big problem” in the international humanitarian 
response system. It was pointed out as a significant red flag for improvement by evaluators 
(STREETS et al., 2010). More than ten years later, this matter seems to persist. It was possible to 
observe an impressive number of documents, meeting notes, and other products, which directly 
resulted from the coordination mechanisms publicized through the R4V platform. Nevertheless, 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, the quantity and frequency of uploads decreased. It is not clear if 
it happened because interactions among R4V partners were affected or simply because documents 
uploads into the platform could not occur for any other reason. It is apprehensible because, during 
2020-21, many humanitarian teams have experienced overworking and difficulties to juggle 
increased demands – as a direct symptom of the nature of the humanitarian work. Anyhow, it 
undoubtedly acts as an indicator that the platform experienced difficulties in guaranteeing its 
continuity and effectiveness, at least in comparison to the pre-COVID period. 
A high frequency of interaction is an indicator of collaboration. The irregularity observed 
in some R4V public updates leaves a question mark whether collaborative arrangements were 
configured, at least for the period 2020-21. 
Moving the discussion to resource-related matters, Four Cs mentions two factors for 
analysis: cost of interaction and shared resources. 
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The Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for 2021 make clear that financial 
resources to respond to the Venezuelan migrant crisis is a strong topic of concern among R4V 
partner organizations. Among common agendas/strategies/goals, the document summarizes 
financial requirements for partner organizations to respond to the migration crisis, necessary for 
planning and fundraising. Nevertheless, understanding the term “shared resources” should not be 
limited to simply “financial resources” and should aggregate various institutional resources used 
to accomplish the mandate of each agency, fund, or program. Meaning it infers financial resources, 
human resources, premises and workspace, products, and services. 
Strong evidence of collaboration through shared resources between UN AFPs in Brazil is 
the UN House, which constitutes shared premises and workspace. Cost-effective strategies are an 
important part of the Business Operations Strategy of the United Nations in the context of the 2030 
agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the UN Reform. Usage of common premises by 
two or more UN AFPs whenever possible and feasible is an excellent symbol of joint fronts of 
these agendas working. Not only it reduces costs, but it also makes their presence more robust in a 
country/location as it externalizes institutional unity among different bodies (UNDSG, 2021). In 
addition, it represents the fulfillment of a recommendation from 2006, when a high-level panel 
presented the Delivering as One Report to the UN General Assembly. Among various 
recommendations, it states the need to establish “one leader, one program, one budgetary 
framework and, where appropriate, one office” at the country level (UNITED NATIONS, 2006, p. 
21). When UN common premises hosts the office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, it is 
a UN House (UNDSG, 2021), which is the case of the UN House in Brasília. 
In addition to the discussion around resources, worth mentioning how the Cluster Approach 
interacts with this subject. Although it is not clear if the Cluster Approach is the strategy locally 
adopted by the UN to respond to the migration crisis in Brazil, sure it takes advantage of 
international structures, communication lines, a spotlight of funding requests, among many other 
factors. The Cluster Approach facilitated the use of shared resources and funding requirements 
globally through common global appeals. During its first years, most resources of the Cluster 
Approach were spent at the global level (offices located in headquarter locations) (STREETS et 
al., 2010). As the strategy approaches the maturity level, a shift has begun from implementation at 
the global to the local level. From this, it is understood that as UN organizations and other cluster 
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lead agencies developed global mechanisms to operationalize the strategy, country offices could 
finally benefit from direct investments and financing.  
Financial requirements increased to implement and sustain inter-organizational 
arrangements and interactions proposed by the strategy, raising some questioning on whether the 
humanitarian system benefits from it. About this, the second evaluation of the Cluster Approach 
made clear affirmations: while any cost of interaction is shared among UN member states and other 
interested donors, deficiencies and ineffectiveness in the strategy are charged at the greater extent 
to populations in need at a human cost (STREETS et al., 2010). 
 
“Developing and implementing the cluster approach has required a 
significant financial investment. Over $ 57 million has been raised through 
global appeals, global cluster lead organizations have contributed from 
their own budgets and annual coordination costs in each country with 
active clusters are several million dollars. This corresponds to less than 1% 
of total humanitarian aid.” (STREETS et al., 2010, p. 8) 
 
Unlike the first evaluation of the Cluster Approach, now the cost inflected over UN AFPs 
has enriched results recognized, helping to advocate for the continuity and promotion of the 
strategy (STODDARD et al., 2007; STREETS et al., 2010). Therefore, the balance between 
investment and results now seems positive, showing improvement that reinforces the benefits and 
gains of its implementation. 
Summing up to this, the second evaluation brought an interesting fact that is already 
defended by experts in business administration as a consensus for a while: not all expensive 
systems are the most effective. It means that having an effective humanitarian response network 
does not necessarily require the most expensive systems in place (STREETS et al., 2010); in fact, 
it means that it shall serve its objective. It should be practical, delivered in a timely fashion 
(considering that time is a fundamental part of all dynamics of crisis), functional and feasible. It 
corroborates that the most effective degree of inter-institutional interaction does not necessarily 
require more resources or has a higher cost. Thereby, institutional interaction degrees listed by 
Martin et al. (2016) should not be seen as a linear scale of efficiency but only   
Important to note that the Cluster Approach and all related guidance matches what is 
mentioned in the theoretical framework as an effective crisis plan, according to Boin and Hart 
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(2010). As the Inter-Agency Standing Committee developed a general plan that divides 
responsibilities between accountable actors, most designated institutions have their own detailed 
and individual plans to cope with their responsibilities to their specialized mandates. As the second 
evaluation of the Cluster Approach affirmed, “clusters have created guidelines, manuals, tools, 
strategies and workplans” (STREETS et al., 2010, p. 70). 
Even though global goals and objectives are often unclear to local staff, other goals are also 
established at the country level to reflect local challenges better. Those are known/followed by 
local staff to a greater extent. The second evaluation also considered it a practice to be 
recommended, allowing the crisis response system and cluster lead agencies to deliver the most 
needed assistance to the populations of concern (STREETS et al., 2010). It is also defended by 
Boin and Hart (2010) as imperative to effective crisis management, considering it allows flexibility 
and adaptability of crisis response systems. It directly affects the degree of embeddedness, which 
was translated previously as a kind of institutional “stickiness” to the strategy and compelling 
operational aspects. 
The first evaluation mentioned a significant lack of knowledge among general Cluster Lead 
Agencies staff; three years later, the second evaluation affirmed that much advancement was made 
and now – although there is still room for improvement (STODDARD et al., 2007; STREETS et 
al., 2010). Professionalization of staff might address it, so they master Cluster Approach principles 
and expectations. Consequently, contributing to the success of this integrated strategy, while in a 
position to make better judgments if it is in the best interest of the organization and the institutional 
group to have any adjustments to core functions of the strategy. 
Henceforth, the Cluster Approach seems not to meet a high frequency of interaction among 
actors. Although the evaluation does not mention frequency, analyzing institutions' interaction, in 
general, may give valuable hints about frequency. Considering the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) 
– a central figure in the international humanitarian response system –, for instance, and how it 
interacts with other teams in the field, there is still much room for improvement (STREETS et al., 
2010). 
Also, note that the UN often uses the term “coordination”, not collaboration, to name some 
mechanisms. This is the case, for instance, of R4V, the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination 
Platform – R4V. However, coordination is part of the name of some of the existing mechanisms, 
reminding that interchangeably usage of concepts and terms is not rare, just as it is in case of crisis, 
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emergencies, disasters, and hazards (Chapter 2). In any case, the R4V might be experiencing 
benefits from collaborative arrangements, although explicitly targeting coordination. 
Considering characteristics of the Four C’s introduced in the theoretical framework (which 
form the analytical categories of the unit of analysis, as per the analytical map), it is now possible 
to look to the degree of institutional interaction with solid foundations. 
Collaborative arrangements appear to be part of strategic discussions made by high-rank 
staff responsible for developing response plans; senior management, primarily. As the focus shifts 
from strategic to tactical and operational levels, the interaction seems to move away from 
collaborative arrangements to cooperation and coordination. Still unsure if it is a conscious or 
unconscious characteristic of the object of the study, which would require consultations with 
critical global staff involved in the international humanitarian crisis response system to clarify. 
Some possible paths to explain cooperation and coordination closer to the field may be related to 
the fundamental aspect of a humanitarian crisis: time. It equally gets more scarce when moving 
from global structures to country offices, even because of how country offices are from affected 
populations and people in need. Future research is yet to understand better and in more detail if 
other crisis scenarios worldwide also observe this same relationship relation. 
Even though staff in the field seem to do not widely exercise collaboration in their duties, 
they experience substantial direct effects of collaboration in higher structures. As seen previously, 
UN global norms and plans guide local activities to guarantee the fulfillment of the broad mandate 
of the UN and the specific mandate of each agency, fund, and program. These norms and plans are 
not a simple formality. Generic structures given by headquarter offices serve as a base for planning 
and implementation in the field; it allows country-specific strategies and activities while allowing 
a solid connection with global priorities. Therefore, planning, monitoring, and evaluation teams 
are responsible to actively assess and report on these, ensuring accountability and evidence-based 
approaches to humanitarian work. 
In addition, it is essential to make some considerations on internal conflicts in the context 
of crisis management. Contributions of Bynander and Nohrstedt (2020) throughout the theoretical 
framework (chapter 2) forecasts conflicts between institutions and categories of responding actors 
in the scene of a crisis. Leo Denise's (1999) work brings this same logic but focuses on 
interinstitutional interaction, not limited to a crisis. Those combined offer valuable insights into 
how managers should address conflict. Rather than using it to disqualify more intricate joint work, 
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they shall consider conflict an integral and fundamental part of coordination and collaboration, not 
meaning resolutions to disputes should not be in place. It is indicative that teams are either 
coordinative or collaborative, from which UN entities may collect benefits – and, as a consequence, 
affected populations in need. 
Finally, and in the light of the theoretical framework, there is strong evidence that 
collaboration grounds the international humanitarian crisis response system and the activities of 


























5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Throughout this paper, the migration crisis of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil meets core 
management concepts while exploring the United Nations institutional response and its inter-
institutional arrangement. Building upon Crisis Management (CM) and Collaborative Crisis 
Management (CCM) literature, this paper presented how is organized the international 
humanitarian response system. In sequence, it explored which international organizations would 
be responsible for responding to crisis, their mandate, and how they are present in Brazil. Also, a 
case study presented their degree of institutional interaction. In chapter 4, empirical evidence meets 
and confronts theory, resulting in the broader understanding of the phenomena of Crisis 
Management in real life and a humanitarian crisis. This analysis included some valuable insights 
based on the COVID-19 pandemic happening at the moment of research, demonstrating impacts in 
the national humanitarian system. 
Crisis Management (CM) and the newborn concept of Collaborative Crisis Management 
(CCM) constitute a study area within management that still has much room for improvement and 
development, as mentioned by Nohrstedt et al. (2018). There is no broad knowledge of their 
essential components and characteristics, turning any dissertation over CM and CCM into a 
difficult path to follow. This paper uses up-to-date sources focusing on material from 2018 to 2021 
whenever possible, building a fresh and contemporary look for CM merging knowledge around 
institutional interaction and collaboration that did not exist previously. 
As this paper concludes, the research question is recalled: how UN agencies, funds, and 
programs in Brazil manage the migration crisis, and what is their degree of institutional interaction? 
In summary, it concludes that the degree of interaction between United Nations agencies, funds, 
and programs responding to Brazil's humanitarian crisis tends highly to collaborative 
arrangements, the most complex degree of interaction among all. While responding to the 
migration crisis of Venezuelans in Brazil, institutions tend to follow the general idea of the Cluster 
Approach, adding and reorganizing partners across clusters to adapt interinstitutional arrangements 
according to needs; which is also forecasted by the global normative since crisis response tends to 
be very country-specific (STREETS et al., 2010, p. 27) 
Highlighting some significant contributions of this paper, we mention the analytical map. 
Solid research cut-outs show how each methodological component grounds on each other and 
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connects with core concepts mobilized during the theoretical framework. The analytical map was 
developed to facilitate the visualization of the organization, serving as a research roadmap and 
guiding the reader throughout the paper. Thereby, it proposes a guide for future studies on Crisis 
Management – related to humanitarian situations or not. 
In addition, Figure 7 clearly illustrates the fundamental position of international 
organizations and NGOs in alleviating human suffering and delivering aid. The United Nations 
System is the major player in response to the influx of  Venezuelan migrants in Brazil, also 
responsible for mobilizing the most significant amount of financial resources. It reiterates the need 
to keep strengthening and supporting the work performed by the UN and internationalism. Also, it 
identifies the significant participation of religious organizations in the response and their ability to 
mobilize crucial financial resources. Fundraising teams should have that into consideration. 
Like any other research, this paper has its limitations; primarily, it must mention the 
decision to have this case study focused on analyzing official and public documents. Considering 
the UN internal policy on sharing internal information of the organization and considering all 
authorizations needed and the deadlines imposed over this paper to its completion, it would make 
this research unviable. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter 3, some natural advantages may be attributed to the 
position occupied by the researcher; a high degree of involvement with the object of the study. The 
author's close relationship with the mentioned institutions and professional involvement with the 
object of the study is a limitation of this paper. This is an imposed and unescapable situation related 
to this specific research. Although impartiality was performed at the best capacity, considering the 
core characteristics to conduct a case study listed by Yin (1994), it is keen to mention that some 
unconscious bias may have implied some prior judgment over the object of and field of study. 
Nevertheless, equally keen to mention that this also acts as an advantage to some extent. Given the 
complexity of crisis management and the whole UN System, some fundamental links and relations 
were provided by the author's proximity to the research topic, which undeniably resulted in 
facilitated choices during the process. 
As a critical question for future studies, this paper suggests directing attention to the 
concepts of the research context: crisis, underdevelopment, and resilience. One of the main 
activities of the United Nations at the country level focuses on the capacity building of national 
institutions, as seen previously. In the light of the theory that crisis and vulnerability of society are 
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aggravated by institutional failure, there is great potential on studying which Brazilian institutions 
experienced development as a direct consequence of the influx of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil – 
not just in relation to UN activities in the country, but broadening to the whole crisis response 
system. Therefore, it should collect evidence on vulnerabilities of Brazilian institutions tackled 
through migration response mechanisms. This may focus on a variety of topics and spheres: social 
protection, law enforcement, safeguarding of Human Rights, shock responsiveness to a crisis, 
among many other possible cutouts. Different social sciences may also be mobilized to provide a 
broader view to this complex topic: public management, political science, sociology, international 
relations, and philosophy. The book “Why Nations Fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and 
poverty” written by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) can be a start-point. 
Finally, coordination and collaboration play an essential role in the international 
humanitarian system. While collaboration seems complex to implement, it requires significant 
institutional resources that may lack a humanitarian crisis. Nevertheless, it may bring valuable 
results only possible through the implementation of this interaction degree. 
It is up to acting managers to use technical knowledge to the greater extent possible, 
grounding decision-making in evidence-based content to guarantee accountability to affected 
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APPENDIX A - Members of the United Nations County Team in Brazil 
 
TABLE 5 
Members of the UNCT in Brazil as on 14 May 2021. 
AFP Name  Position Cluster Lead Agency 
RC Office Silvia Rucks Resident Coordinator Yes 
RC Office Larissa Leite RC Office Team Leader Yes 
RC Office Isadora Ferreira Programme Communications and 
Advocacy Officer 
Yes 
UNHCR José Egas Representative Yes 
IOM Stephane Rostiaux Representative Yes 
UNDP Katyna Argueta Resident Representative Yes 
UNICEF Florence Bauer Representative Yes 
WFP Daniel Silva Balaban Representative and Director Yes 
FAO Rafael Zavala Representative Yes 
WHO Socorro Gross Galiano Representative Yes 
OHCHR Jan Jarab Representative No 
UN ECLAC Carlos Mussi Country Director No 
ILO Martin Hahn Country Director No 
WIPO José Graça Aranha Regional Director No 
UN Women Anastasia Divinskaya Representative No 
UN-Habitat Elkin Velasquez Regional Director No 
UNEP Denise Hamú Representative No 
ITU Bruno Ramos Regional Director No 
UNAIDS Claudia Velasquez Representative and Director No 
UNESCO Marlova Jovchelovitch 
Noleto 
Representative No 
UNFPA Astrid Bant Representative No 
UNIC Kimberly Mann Country Director a.i. No 
84 
 
UNIDO Alessandro Amadio Representative No 
UNODC Elena Abbati Country Director No 
UNDRR Raul Salazar Regional Director No 
UNOPS Claudia Valenzuela Representative No 
IFAD Claus Reiner Representative No 
IOM Stephane Rostiaux Representative No 
IMF Joana Pereira Representative No 
























ANNEX A – Chart of the United Nations System 
 
 
FIGURE 10 – Chart of the United Nations System 
Source: United Nations, 2019. 
